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Structured abstract
This paper examines the ongoing “new extraction” on the African continent. Contrary to 
mainstream scholarship and policies seeing in law an external variable to remedy the 
“resource curse”, this article channels attention towards the role of law as an institution of 
extraction in the longue durée. Unpacking the close association of law with the conversion of 
economic surpluses and power into enduring social relationships is used as an entry-point to 
trace the mechanisms by which the uneven and unequal connection between Africa and the 
world is being negotiated, justified and challenged over time.
To this end, this article deploys an approach anchored in political sociology of law and 
focused on the roles played specifically by lawyers to trace the “interconnectedness” between 
European colonialism on the continent and the consolidation of the contemporary 
international economic and legal political order. It illustrates this approach with the case-
study of the “Africa” Bar in Paris as a key site in which extractive deals between 
multinational corporations and Francophone African states are negotiated. 
This micro focus helps explain the dual position of the “Africa” Bar in Paris, as offshore yet 
connected as it is shaped by both imperial legacies and ongoing waves of globalization into 
the African continent. 
This approach traces a more nuanced explanation of Africa’s unequal and uneven 
relationship with the global economy, as one shaped by the path of imperial legacies and 
successive and interconnected waves of globalization across Africa. 
Key words: new extraction; Africa; Political sociology; global mineral value chains; lawyers
Lawyers and the “new extraction” in Africai
Introduction. The “new extraction” in Africa: a challenge for policy and scholarship
Over the past fifteen years, the African continent has gained renewed prominence as a 
“mining frontier” (see Campbell 2009) in a context marked by the increased competition for 
critical raw materials and carbon energy and the ascent of China as an economic superpower.  
These changes have raised hopes for the economic takeoff of the continent. A 2010 
McKinsey report estimated the potential benefits of consumer-facing industries, resources, 
agriculture, and infrastructure together across the continent at $2.6 trillion in revenue 
annually by 2020 (Roxburgh et al. 2010). 
However, the expansion of the “extractive frontier” in African contexts has come 
along with increased inequalities, violent societal conflicts and environmental risks, increased 
by the volatility of mineral prices on global markets. This renewed prominence of the African 
continent emerged in a context that contrasted markedly with the “new extraction” across 
Latin America a decade earlier (Bebbington 2009). The mining boom of the last two decades 
was most pronounced in Latin America, with a growth of the global share of Latin America 
in mining investment from 10 to 25% between 2003 and 2012 (Deonandan and Dougherty 
2016), while to a large extent the rush is yet to come in Africa where mineral reserves remain 
for the most part untapped (Rosenblum 2016). In Latin American contexts the new extraction 
has also been accompanied by political and social movements fostering - with varying 
degrees of success - a radical agenda of post-extractivism. This included the assertion of 
indigenous rights of local communities over extractive resources, notably through the 
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increased exercise of the right to free, prior and informed consent institutionalized in various 
international legal instruments since the 1980s (see Raftopoulos 2017; Szablowski, 2007). 
By contrast, the boom in extractive investments on the African continent in the first 
decade of the 2000s came at the tail-end of structural adjustment programs, spearheaded by 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs). These reforms engineered the privatization of 
extractive economies to foster the regulatory strength of private actors and markets against 
political elites and weak governance. Yet, international campaigns spearheaded by 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) such as Global Witness at the end of 
the 1990s on so-called “blood diamonds” underscored the Far-west like rush for extractive 
minerals in African contexts, foremost in the conflict-rife Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Campaigns for contract and revenue transparency, environmental protection, and corruption 
investigations in the 2000s yielded some success in spurring a global regulatory tide over 
extractive resources markets, including through the growing reach of the 1977 US Foreign 
corrupt practices Act (FCPA) (see Rich and Moberg 2015). 
However, they could do little to curb the violence unleashed by this rush precisely 
because it unravelled in regions where global capitalism “finds minimally regulated zones in 
which to vest its operations” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012: 13). Indeed, these advocacy 
campaigns and policy initiatives happened “in a game of catch-up where the damage of the 
initial gaps have never fully been assessed” (Rosenblum 2016). Ongoing battles on the 
detrimental societal and environmental effects of extractive deals between multinationals and 
resource-rich states continue to stress the acuteness of contests over the distribution of natural 
resources and benefits derived from them. They also pinpoint “loopholes” in the reach of 
global regulations (see Cutler and Dietz 2017) and the difficulty (if not total lack) of remedies 
available to disenfranchised communities at the national and international levels (see Muir 
Watt et al. 2019). 
Part of the difficulty relates to the framing of the regulatory response to the issue of 
the governance of extractives on the African continent. The “resource curse” idea (see for an 
excellent critical overview, Murrey forthcoming) has gained traction in research and policy-
making since the end of the 1980s as the dominant lens to understand the poor development 
performance of natural resource-rich African countries, due to wealth capture by corrupt 
political elites and conflict. The “resource curse” explanation has exerted a strong policy pull 
from the 1990s. The overwhelming tendency of IFIs is to point to domestic political factors 
as the key explanation for the disappointing returns of mining riches, i.e. corruption, lack of 
transparency and weak governance in African contexts (see Collier 2007). 
In the past couple of decades, the “resource curse” has generated intense debates, 
focused foremost on the methodology used to assert a causality between extractive 
governance and poor socio-economic performance (see the critique by Bebbington et al. 
2018: 3-4). Debates on the resource curse have since evolved to focus on institutional quality 
as a primary determinant of diverging development outcomes. Scholarship in economics is 
increasingly underlining that rather than simply resources themselves, it is the institutions of 
extraction that play a crucial role in shaping the societal and environmental impacts of 
extractive commodities (Acemoglu and Robinson 2014). Thus, “‘getting the institutions 
right’ became the central objective in efforts at ‘escaping the resource curse’” (ibid: 3, 
quoting Humphreys et al. 2007). 
Yet, building partly on the resource curse debate as well as on scholarship that 
preceded it, a growing body of work is emphasizing the need to understand the role of these 
institutional drivers in resource-dependent development not simply as top-down externally-
driven variables to remedy the “resource curse”. Rather, it is their role in the longue durée 
that needs to be assessed: “one cannot build a framework to analyse the relationships between 
politics, extractive industry, and development and then introduce ‘institutions’ as an 
Page 2 of 37International Journal of Social Economics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Social Econom
ics
3
independent mediating variable. Such institutions are themselves a product of the same 
relationships that they mediate and have to be accounted for historically” (Bebbington et al. 
2018: 6). 
Looking at the longue durée of institutions of extraction recognizes that just like Latin 
America’s, much of Africa’s “economic and social history could be read as a long 
engagement with extraction” (Bebbington 2009: 14). The central role played by the African 
continent in the emergence and expansion of contemporary capitalism has long been 
established in a rich body of scholarship in political economy (drawing in particular on 
Rodney 1972) and anthropological and ethnographic work (see e.g., Ferguson 2006; Ellis 
2012). 
This article builds on and contributes to this body of work by channeling attention 
towards the role, in the longue durée, of law as an institution of extraction. The global 
regulatory tide has spurred an increased demand for law, and with it for lawyers, to 
strengthen the governance of mineral markets, be it in the form of “corporate social 
responsibility” or the stability of extractive contracts. A great deal of the scholarship focused 
on international and domestic legal regimes governing extractives is concerned with the 
pluralism opened by the interplay between multiple, overlapping and often conflicting local, 
national, regional and international legal regimes (see Szablowski 2007) and the gaps for 
accountability fostered by the globalization and financialization of mineral value chains 
(Cutler and Dietz 2017). Certainly, the prominence taken by “corporate social responsibility” 
as a set of “soft” laws self-governing extractive industries has contributed to the growth of an 
interdisciplinary body of literature attuned to the power relations at play in the interactions 
between corporate activity and societies (Walker-Said and Kelly 2015).
However, that law, in the form of multiple, overlapping and often conflicting local, 
national, regional and transnational legal regimes, as well as soft and hard law, plays a 
constitutive role in the ordering of mineral global value chains is yet to have gained enough 
traction in scholarship (see IGLP Law and Global Production Working Group, 2016). 
Policies still overwhelmingly tend to focus on law as a top-down and external variable, 
seeing in “clear rules” of governance a solution to the poor development returns of resource-
rich African countries (e.g. Smith and Rosenblum 2011). 
This article therefore calls for a renewed research agenda amenable to trace the 
interaction between law and extraction in the political economy of African states and in their 
relationship with global markets for extractives in the longue durée. The central claim of this 
research agenda is that uncovering the social, economic and political variables channeled 
through law and shaped by law provides a formidable entry point to trace the mechanisms by 
which the uneven and unequal connection between Africa and the world (see Cooper 2014) is 
being negotiated, justified and challenged over time. 
Section 2 describes the approach fostered here and the explanatory lens it is amenable 
to provide. It suggests the relevance of combining a political sociology of law and of lawyers 
through a micro focus centered on the roles played specifically by lawyers as builders of the 
state and intermediaries of globalization in Africa. Such an approach can help trace 
developments that remain otherwise invisible, notably the “interconnectedness” 
(Subrahmanyam 2004) between European colonialism on the continent, the emergence of 
global capitalism, and the consolidation of the contemporary international economic and 
legal political order since the colonial era. This micro focus, further, can help overcome the 
dis-connection between efforts to foster the redistribution of natural resources in resource-
rich African states, and outcomes seen to continuously favor the prominent position of 
Northern multinationals and state elites in the African South. The approach of globalization 
suggested here underlines dynamics of flows and counter-flows (see Ibhawoh 2013) that go 
beyond dichotomies between the Global North and the Global South, international law, and 
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sovereignty. These dynamics indeed point to a more nuanced (though not less bleak) 
explanation of Africa’s unequal and uneven relationship with the global economy, as one 
shaped by the path of imperial legacies and successive interconnected waves of globalization 
across Africa.  Section 3 illustrates this research agenda with an emblematic empirical case-
study: that of the “Africa Bar” in Paris, as a key site in which extractive deals between 
multinational corporations and Francophone states in West Africa are negotiated. It 
underlines the offshore yet connected structure of this small professional market, which, 
though tamed in recent years through regulatory pressures, still fosters inter-personal 
relations between French, white, corporate lawyers and African political elites.  
Law(yers) in the uneven and unequal relationship between Africa and the world 
economy 
Debates on the role of law and legal institutions in the development of African states do not 
escape a protracted dependency lens. The failure of the legal systems inherited from 
colonization (see World Bank 2003) has been coupled with the need to reform - if not 
reinvent - legal institutions so as to check the tendency towards personal, tyrannical and anti-
entrepreneurial governance (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001). A number of studies focused on 
the governance of extractives across Africa  have certainly underscored the positive effects of 
some legal reforms, especially international legal initiatives aimed at transforming the 
behavior of multinational extractive companies, such as section 1502 of the U.S. Dodd-
Franck Act of 2010, which requires publicly traded companies to ensure that the raw 
materials they use to make their products are not tied to the conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, or soft law initiative led by the corporate sector itself to foster the social 
responsibility of its members, such as the International Council on Mining and Metals (see 
Berman et al. 2017; Rich and Moberg 2015). Yet, some of these same studies are also 
highlighting paradoxes. Berman et al.’s economic study (2017) unsurprisingly correlates the 
surge of societal conflict at the local level with the presence of foreign extractive companies 
on the African continent, which account for 60% of the sector. However, they also emphasize 
the sustainability of social ties: according to these authors, the presence of multinational 
corporate firms with a colonial past does not increase violence at the local level. This 
somewhat surprising conclusion lies in political embeddedness, that is the capacity of these 
corporations to benefit from the (military) protection of the host state.  
The ongoing Global history turn in historical scholarship, particularly legal history 
(see Benton and Ford 2016), has opened promising avenues to connect law to such political, 
economic and social variables, in the longue durée. This body of scholarship underscores the 
connections between successive and competing imperial models, emphasizing how imperial 
legacies have been embedded in the modern nation state and the contemporary international 
legal and political order (see Burbank and Cooper 2010). Law was the cutting edge of 
colonialism (Chanock 1985), but colonialism was also ripe with conflicts over law’s remit. 
Thus, the imposition of a body of property law attuned to the economic interests of 
métropoles in their colonies was used to marshal the products of extraction - be it slaves, 
crops or minerals - to the metropolitan cores, and to ascertain a global political economy that 
would entrench colonies in the periphery. But the question of who benefited from property 
rights over land and extractive goods at the local level was the object of intense and 
continuous struggles - between European merchants, colonial administrators and local chiefs, 
among others (see Breckenridge 2011). In other words, law’s remit depended heavily on 
social and political variables at the local level. 
Page 4 of 37International Journal of Social Economics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Social Econom
ics
5
The embeddedness of the contemporary international legal and economic order in 
colonialism has long been established (see Anghie 2005). Yet, Benton and Ford (2016) also 
trace how international law emerged out of a haphazard process over several centuries. 
Ultimately contributing to the growing reach of the metropolitan core and fostering the 
position of the British as world hegemon from the mid-19th century, this process was heavily 
influenced and mediated by middle-men and social hierarchies at the local level and by 
political conflicts that circulated and boomeranged back and forth between the métropoles, 
the colonies and among empires. International law in the form of an international legal order 
reflected therefore a series of bilateral treaties and other legal regimes that created a series of 
permissive spaces for imperial enforcement relying on British municipal law - specifically in 
relation to property rights - and producing patchy regulatory regimes. 
This body of scholarship emphasizes the relevance of looking at social ties not only as 
a defining feature of colonial rule, but also as a structural component of law. They thereby 
open paths to trace the close association of law with the conversion of economic surpluses 
and power into enduring social relationships, in the longue durée. These insights on the 
diffusion of what was gradually institutionalized as international law – what Benton and Ford 
(2016) refer to as “vernacular constitutionalism”  can also provide interesting paths, 
synchronically, to make sense of the re-structuration of markets for extractive commodities 
since the 1990s due to their increased globalization and financialization. The highly 
fragmented structure of the global market for minerals, which gives the upper hand to private 
corporations (mostly Northern) in the production, pricing, and investment decisions, while 
allowing for a multiplicity of intermediaries, from local chiefs through to red-neck extractive 
companies less vulnerable to reputational costs, plays into the relative breadth and scope of 
global regulatory frameworks, themselves shaped by intense economic and political struggles 
between the United States and emerging economic cores, foremost China. Again, law seems 
to be the cutting edge of these dynamics. Ongoing initiatives aimed at transforming the 
asymmetrical relationship between African states and private Northern multinational 
corporations stem from the need to stabilize foreign investments, away from the economic, 
political, and reputational costs of the renegotiation of extractive contracts, and their contests 
in arbitrational and jurisdictional settings, including by “third parties” to extractive contracts 
like local communities. Again, also, distribution conflicts over extractives are played through 
law and are as much about law’s remit as they unfold across multiple scales (see Muir Watt et 
al. 2019). 
A recent call for an inter-disciplinary dialogue between critical global political 
economy and legal scholarship to address the importance taken by multinationals in political 
and economic governance is offering some insights to address the challenges raised by this 
fragmentation. Looking in particular at the prominence taken by private contracts – and with 
them, by private actors - in global governance, Cutler and Dietz (2017) frontally address the 
question of “who gets what,” that is who benefits or loses out of a global economy growingly 
structured around private contracts as an institution of transnational governance, in that it 
continuously redefines the frontiers between politics, economics and societies at the domestic 
and global level. Part of this research agenda speaks specifically to the question of 
extractives, by underscoring the need to document relations of power along mineral chains, 
from the domestic level through to global markets (see Cutler 2017). 
The research agenda opened by these combined insights is exceptionally challenging 
as it requires combining focal lengths, by zooming in onto specific contexts and by zooming 
out on global changes (see Cooper 2014) so as to trace the interconnectedness between legal, 
political, economic and social variables, and local, national, regional and global scales. It is 
also confronted to acute knowledge gaps, specifically on intermediaries, such as lawyers, 
involved in the negotiation of extractive deals. Seemingly on a par with the ebb and flow of 
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policy orientations and geostrategic interests over the continent, lawyers involved in the “new 
extraction” are overwhelmingly construed under two opposed guises. They are either 
denounced as mercenaries at the service of new forms of colonial “looting” (e.g. Burgis 
2015) or idealized as a professional corps defending the rule of law (see Halliday et al. 2012). 
Yet, focusing on lawyers - their trajectories, their characteristics and their professional 
strategies, can provide a formidable entry-point to trace these inter-connections.  This 
political sociology of law and of lawyers reflects the research path opened by Ernst 
Kantorowicz (1989) and others in his wake, who have shown that lawyers are structurally 
positioned to play “double games” (Dezalay and Garth 2011). While at the service of power 
holders - and as such playing a central role of legitimation of state power - lawyers also need 
to distance themselves from politics, as a condition to protect the autonomy of the law, and 
with it their professional practices. Tracing these “double games” has opened rich avenues to 
trace and account for the interstitial position of legal elites - African, European, and others - 
in the trajectory of the state and as intermediaries of the successive phases of globalization on 
the African continent (see Dezalay 2015; 2018). Negotiating sovereignty as “shared out, 
layered [and] overlapping” (Burbank and Cooper 2010: 17) in imperial settings, lawyers 
could navigate between corporate and state power, the colony and the métropoles and inter-
imperial confrontations. Imperial legal realms were particularly favorable to the positions of 
lawyers as both collaborators and opponents (Oguamanam and Pue 2016): thus, lawyers’ 
double games were embedded in, as much as they were shaping, battles over state power.
This approach is instrumental to trace how the legacy of the imperial realm is played 
out in the present, providing the path from which current developments emerge or diverge 
from (Dezalay and Garth 2010). But it also emphasizes how, in the present, hegemonic 
battles continue to be played in conflicts through and around law. This entry-point has indeed 
proven a formidable way to account for patterns of globalization in the contemporary era, in 
particular to trace US-led hegemonic exports of ideals and practices across Latin America 
and Asia (Dezalay and Garth 2002; 2010). De sa e Silva and Trubek (2018) underscore the 
interdependence, if not symbiosis, between the professional power of corporate lawyers and 
economic development strategies in the past thirty years in Brazil, and the importance of 
alignment with and resources drawn from international links, specifically with the corporate 
legal sector in the US. In a current context of acute global competition over critical minerals 
and carbon energy, and growing contests for hegemony by new economic superpowers like 
China, tracing the profiles, resources and strategies of lawyers involved in the negotiation of 
extractive contracts between multinationals and resource-rich African states can thus offer a 
way not only to see how imperial pasts are woven into the present, but also how new forms of 
imperialism may be emerging. 
A case-study of the “Africa Bar” in Paris: offshore, yet connectedii
The case study presented here to provide an empirical example is an apparently counter-
intuitive illustration: the “Africa” Bar in Paris. Yet, tracing the individual trajectories and 
professional strategies of the lawyers operating within this social microcosm underscores 
how this site emerged as key marketplace in which extractive deals, along with other 
emerging economic sectors such as infrastructures and telecommunications, are negotiated 
between multinational corporations and African states. This entry-point also helps explain the 
offshore geographical position of this site due to an enduring double position of Paris: as a 
former colonial métropole, and also as a beach-head in the expansion of U.S.-led 
globalization of corporate law toward Europe from the 1980s, and more recently into Africa. 
The analysis of the social relations at play in this microcosm thus provides an emblematic 
entry-point to trace how the relationship between extractive economies, state transformations, 
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and the position of Africa in globalization are negotiated in the longue durée. It is also a 
crucial site to map out law’s entanglement with social networks, politics, and economics, 
across time and space. 
Focusing on lawyers operating within this “Africa” Bar in Paris, I have relied on a 
qualitative methodology that can be described as relational biography.iii Asking respondents 
who they are, that is exploring not only their professional and educational background but 
also their social characteristics, is a way to trace how successful their strategies could be in 
entering and positioning themselves within this small professional market. Beyond, it is a 
way to map out the configuration of this space across time and space.
Channelling attention towards the agents invested in this Bar and their characteristics 
is also the only way to depart from apparently irreconcilable oppositions - between the 
national, and the international, and foremost the ideological trope under which extractive 
deals are commonly construed. “It’s a White’s business!” iv interjected a senior economic 
consultant asked about dealings between resource-rich African states and multinationals from 
the North. The spectre of neo-colonialism in the on-going rush for natural resources in Africa 
is intensified by the economy of appearances which shrouds the industry. Talks of mining 
“booms” or of the “perfect storm” are mired with rumours. Not only are extractive contracts 
between resource-rich states and multinationals for the most part sealed under a lid of 
secrecy. But accurate data on actual extractive potentials, projects and economic returns are 
hard, if not impossible, to come by. Particularly in France, due to the sulphurous legacy of 
the “Françafrique,”v the reputation of lawyers involved in dealings in the African continent 
has been tainted with phantasms and denunciations. The “Club of Africans,” hailed as the 
“white marabouts of the Françafrique” (Hugeux 2007), was described somewhat scathingly 
by a respondent as comprising the “incompetent,” the “suitcase carriers,” the “skilled-ones 
who know how to carry suitcases” and the “skilled ones who carry portfolios.”vi 
Yet, the originally extremely select “Africa club” of Paris has recently grown into an 
enlarged though still restricted market of about twenty lawyers, controlled by a dozen Paris 
offices of U.S. and U.K. multinational corporate law firms. Yet, this small market remains 
dominated predominantly by French male lawyers operating within these firms. The 
trajectory of a prominent member of this Bar can help explain what can thus be described as a 
symbolic revamping of legal deals between multinational corporations and resource-rich 
states on the African continent - but only, though, through a slight displacement in the 
structure of positions within this small professional market. After studying law in France, 
Antoine left for Vanuatu, as a “conscientious objector,”vii where he was appointed as public 
prosecutor at the country’s independence in 1980. Antoine then studied international law in 
Australia, which he described as “a rare vocation” at the time. After working at the Crédit du 
Nord for two years in financing, he moved to Gabon, as an associate at Fidafrica, the legal 
branch of PricewaterCoopers (PwC), until 1998. In this capacity, he became the counsel of 
Samuel Dossou Aworet - Gabon’s “Mr Oil.” 
The recent conversion of this “White African” as a vocal proponent of the “social 
responsibility of corporations,” notably as a member of the Corporate Social Responsibility 
Committee of the American Bar Association, can be explained by external shocks - 
politically and economically driven - that have contributed to restructuring the social 
structure of this small niche of counsels for corporations and African heads of state. The 
growth of this legal market can be attributed in part to the increased financialization of 
commodities markets in the past fifteen years, and with it to the growing technicality of 
dealings on the continent (see UNCTAD 2012). Multinational corporate law firms were 
better positioned to benefit from these changes due to their collective know how, from the 
negotiation of contracts, to arbitration. The 2008 financial crisis and, before that, the Enron 
scandal in 2002 which precipitated the demise of Andersen and shed light on the conflicts of 
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interest of consulting firms, like PwC, also opened new opportunities for multinational 
corporate law firms towards these new emerging economic markets (see The Economist 
2015).  
Other global drivers help explain the dynamics of this enlargement. On the one hand, 
incentives for the global regulation of dealings between foreign corporations and resource-
rich states in Africa increasingly impact on the operations of multinational corporations on 
the continent. For the most part a set of soft law - known as “corporate social responsibility,” 
non-binding on corporations - these regulations carry heavy reputational costs. The growing 
reach of the 1977 US FCPA against corruption, and the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (Rich and Moberg 2015) also played an instrumental role. Extractive deals in the 
African continent are also heavily impacted by development policies and the role of invisible 
actors sitting at the negotiation table between multinationals and resource-rich African states: 
the World Bank and bilateral development agencies. Most lawyers in the “Africa club” thus 
got their introduction to the developing continent by working on sovereign debt restructuring 
in the 1980s. The waves of privatization of extractive industries - spearheaded by the World 
Bank through the 1980s - opened up opportunities for corporate lawyers, and so did the 
promotion of “public-private partnerships” from the early 1990s, as they position the contract 
and the lawyer at the heart of the relation between the public sector and the private sector (see 
Vauchez 2012: 79). 
Driven foremost by the need to stabilize foreign investments - against challenges to 
extractive contracts, like national fiscal policies of “upwards adjustments” (so-called 
“resource nationalism”), and jurisdictional contests - a number of North-driven policy 
endeavours have aimed at “levelling the playing field” between foreign corporations and 
African states since the 2010s. For example, the “Connex Initiative”viii spearheaded by the 
German government during its presidency of the G7 in 2014 aimed at drafting a “code of 
conduct” to “strengthen advisory support to low-income country governments in their 
negotiation of complex commercial contracts - to make the support that is available more 
comprehensive and more responsive to governments’ needs and to contribute to fairer, more 
sustainable investment deals.”ix The African Legal Support Facility set up in 2010 in Abidjan 
under the umbrella of the African Development Bank - and the sponsorship of the NGO 
Transparency International - similarly endeavours to provide assistance to African countries 
to strengthen their legal expertise and negotiating capacity in debt management and litigation, 
natural resources and extractive industries management and contracting, investment 
agreements, and related commercial and business transactions. For both initiatives, a core aim 
is therefore to restructure legal services to African states away from a charismatic market of 
shadow advisors, towards an enlarged and more transparent market of legal services to states. 
Yet, to understand the ambiguous impact of these changes on the “Africa club” in 
Paris it is necessary to relate them to two other connected dynamics: the structuration of the 
corporate Bar in Paris over time; and the threads of relations between France and its former 
colonies. Both define barriers of entry and the distribution of positions in a space whose 
structure has been transformed under the impetus of the “Wall street” law firm model since 
the 1990s (see Dezalay 1992), but whose boundaries remain defined by the capacities to 
access and juggle across poles of power (economics, politics, social) shaped by the relations 
between Paris and its former colonies. 
This is particularly visible in the trajectory of one of the few Africans within this 
select market, Pascal Agboyibor. In his late forties, this Togolese lawyer is one of the very 
few Africans working at multinational corporate law firms, what more, as a sitting member of 
the administrative council of the U.S. firm Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP and the head of 
its Africa department in Paris. Agboyibor is hailed as a “shadow power broker” (Ngisi 2015) 
of transactions between states and foreign corporations in the African continent. With a 60 
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people strong department, Orrick, he claims, invests a huge proportion of its activities - 20% 
- in Africa. “I was taught very early on that I would become a lawyer.”x The law, for 
Agboyibor is an acute political and family matter. His father, Yawovi Agboyibo, a former 
president of the Lomé Bar, political opponent and Prime minister in the transition between 
the Gnassingbé regimes (in 2006-2007) played a prominent role in the transition of Togo to 
multi-partyism in 1991. Yawovi Agboyibo had also turned to corporate law in the early 
1970s by integrating the very first law firm of the country,xi after studying law in France. 
During an era when the newly independent state of Togo was massively recruiting into the 
administration, this choice appeared like an anomaly. Yet, investing in corporate law had 
insured the conversion of the resources of this royal family, evinced from local power since 
the 1930sxii by the French colonial administration, towards the political and economic 
networks tying the country to its former métropole. 
One generation later, this proximity contributed to propel Pascal Agboyibor into the 
close-knit corporate Bar in Paris, first in 1993 at Jeantet et Associés, one of the French 
pioneers of corporate law, before joining the Paris branch of the U.K. firm Watson, Farley 
and Williams in 2000, whose teams integrated with Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP in 
2002. Agboyibor became a partner at Orrick in 2003. After studying law in Lille, Agboyibor 
built up his portfolio of African relations during a secondment at the African Development 
Bank in Abidjan in 1996 and on introductions from his father - notably to take on the latter’s 
arbitration disputes between the Democratic Republic of Congo and “vulture funds.”xiii
Agboyibor’s trajectory thus unveils a “layered” habitus pointing to the multiple 
historical strata of legal globalization on the African continent as much as their connexions 
with local struggles and political hierarchies. But it also points to the wider transformation of 
corporate legal markets since the 1990s and the prominent yet ambiguous position of Paris in 
these developments. When he started his career, Agboyibor strategically invested in 
securitization, positioning himself in the financialisation of commodities markets. He 
reinvested fully his African portfolio in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, which prompted 
the search of multinational corporate law firms for new markets in emerging economies, 
including Africa. 
While only 10% of Agboyibor’s practice involved business transactions on the 
African continent in 2008, it now accounts for 99% of his time. Though, when he entered 
Jeantet in the early 1990s, there were but a handful of Africans in corporate law firms in Paris 
- and elsewhere. His first “African” case involved the Chad-Cameroun pipeline. “It was the 
old argument at the time. They needed an African to sit at the table. There is a deep symbolic 
violence behind this. This is probably what made me leave Jeantet. There is a huge difference 
between French and Anglo-Saxon firms on this.” 
Part of the success of U.S. and U.K. corporate law firms in dominating the corporate 
legal market for extractives in Paris also stems out of the huge capacity of multinational law 
firms - as opposed to solo legal practice - in dodging the volatility of markets for 
commodities (and with them, that of legal markets), including by waging multi-front legal 
strategies: from the negotiation of contracts to arbitration or litigation. As underscored by a 
respondent: “the difference between Agboyibor and others is the structure of the firm: it is 
better than having lone lawyers doing all the work.”xiv Yet, it is also no accident that 
predominantly French lawyers operate within this market. It enables these firms to build on a 
symbolic displacement, away from the stigmata of the “Françafrique”, while still also 
benefiting from the know who of these lawyers.
It is perhaps on the side of services to states that the transformation of the “Africa” 
Bar in Paris is the deepest – though the shift remains symbolic. As explained by a respondent, 
in the past “there was not much regulation. We still work a lot for states, but it is mostly 
private practice. The practice of counselling for states has evolved. It is more transparent, 
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more open. Now it works a lot on the basis of tenders. Before, it was through inter-personal 
relations; presidents and political advisors would meet their counsels by chance encounters, 
in restaurants. Now except for counsels to presidents, where it is different, it is all on the 
basis of tenders.”xv  Initiatives such as “Connex” or the African Legal Facility mentioned 
above aim precisely at opening up this still extremely close-knit market defined by 
cha ismatic characteristics and inter-personal ties.
The stake of these transformations is indeed access to Africa as a new market for 
corporations and law multinationals from the U.S. and the U.K.: as stated by a professional 
publication, “an Africa office is no magic door to deals” (Taylor 2016) especially if new-
comers are not corporations with an imperial past (The Economist 2016). The offshore – yet 
connected – structure of the Africa Bar in Paris could thus be long term - depending on the 
pace of development and varied structure of national legal fields on the African continent.   
Conclusion 
In media and specialist accounts, talks of the end of the commodities’ “super cycle” - 
and with it, the fear of African states plunging into the debt crisis of the 1980s have re-ignited 
the “resource curse” debate.  Policies continue to correlate the poor development 
performance of resource-rich African states to their poor governance and the weakness of 
their institutions.  Yet, channeling attention towards law not as an external variable to curb 
the “resource curse”, but rather itself an institution of extraction in the longue durée can 
provide for a more nuanced picture of the role played by law, over time, to negotiate, justify 
and challenge the uneven and unequal relationship between Africa and the world economy 
over time. 
The position of the “Africa” Bar in Paris underscored the relevance of looking at the 
past to understand the transformation of this relationship over time. Channeling attention 
towards the characteristics of the agents invested in the “Africa” Bar, their biographies and 
their professional strategies, underscored the specificities of this professional market as a 
“cross-roads” space. Structured around combinations of resources - economic, social, 
political, and legal -, this space is by definition trans-national, shaped by imperial legacies 
and the 1980s’ wave of corporate legal globalization into continental Europe. 
It is also a symbolic space where the terms of the unequal and uneven relationship between 
Africa and the world economy are constantly being (re)defined. What makes the “Africa” Bar 
in Paris offshore, yet deeply connected, is precisely the tension between the need to rely on 
local structures of power to do business on the African continent, and the strategy of evading 
local legal institutions. The “Africa” Bar in Paris is also a nexus where overlapping dynamics 
of globalization are at play and where the stakes of who benefits from these struggles are 
shaped as much by imperial legacies as proximity to new poles of economic and political 
power. Paris thereby emerges as a marketplace of “connected histories”:  U.S.-led corporate 
legal globalization, colonial, and postcolonial relations.  Yet, dramatic and ongoing changes 
on the continent itself, notably with the expansion of thriving local corporate bars in regional 
powerhouses like South Africa or Nigeria (see Klaaren 2015), along with the global 
competition between the United States, Europe and powerful new economic and political 
centers, foremost China, may be yet again re-shaping the relationship between Africa and the 
global economy. The expansion of a “Beijing consensus” freed from political conditionality, 
and outside the scope of U.S. imperial politics (see Halper 2010) and materialized with the 
massive Chinese investments into Africa through the “Belt and Road initiative” are indeed 
heralding the continent “as a place where international rivalries play out” (The Economist 
2019). The challenge now, in the next step of this research agenda, would be precisely to 
zoom out into these global competition, and specifically the role played by China, as much as 
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to zoom in onto local legal markets across the African continent to trace their transformation 
over time in relation to national fields of state power, regional dynamics, and their 
connections with former métropoles and these new poles of global power. 
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Structured abstract
Purpose
This paper tackles the ongoing “new extraction” on the African continent. The failure of 
global policy efforts to foster the governance of mineral global value chains triggers an acute 
challenge for scholarship. It reflects knowledge gaps on the relationship between extractives, 
their role in contemporary global capitalism and the position of Africa in these developments.
Approach
To overcome these policy hurdles and knowledge gaps, this article calls for a renewed 
research agenda, combining critical political economy, Global history and political sociology. 
It channels the attention towards the role played by law(yers) in these interconnections over 
time. It illustrates this approach with the case-study of the “Africa” Bar in Paris which is a 
key site in which extractive deals between multinational corporations and African states in 
West Africa are negotiated
Findings
A micro focus attentive to the characteristics of lawyers negotiating deals between 
multinationals and African states helps explain the dual position of the “Africa” Bar in Paris, 
as offshore yet connected as it is shaped by both imperial legacies and ongoing waves of 
globalization into the African continent. 
Originality
This research agenda, the first to combine these separate strands of knowledge, can play a 
powerful role to draw a more nuanced understanding of the unequal and uneven relationship 
between Africa and the world economy over time. 
Key words: new extraction; Africa; Political sociology; global mineral value chains; lawyers
Lawyers and the “new extraction” in Africai
Introduction. The “new extraction” in Africa: a challenge for policy and scholarship
Over the past fifteen years, the African continent has gained renewed prominence as a 
“mining frontier” (see Campbell 2009) in the wake of thea context marked by the increased 
competition for critical raw materials and carbon energy and the ascent of China as an 
economic superpower. and acute global competition for critical raw materials and carbon 
energy. In 2013, fuel and mineral exports from Africa reached $397 million, fifteen times 
more than development aid flows into the continent.ii  These changes have raised hopes for 
the economic takeoff of the continent. A 2010 McKinsey report estimated the potential 
benefits of consumer-facing industries, resources, agriculture, and infrastructure together 
across the continent at $2.6 trillion in revenue annually by 2020 (Roxburgh et al. 2010). 
However, the expansion of the “extractive frontier” in African contexts has come 
along with increased inequalities, violent societal conflicts and environmental risks, increased 
by the volatility of mineral prices on global markets. The This renewed prominence of the 
African continent as a boon for extractive resources emerged in a context that contrasteds 
markedly with the “new extraction” in across Latin American contexts a decade earlier 
(Deonandan and Dougherty 2016; Bebbington 2009). The The mining boom of the last two 
decades was most pronounced in Latin America, with a growth of the global share of Latin 
America in mining investment from 10 to 25% between 2003 and 2012 (Deonandan and 
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Dougherty 2016), while to a large extent the rush is yet to come in Africa where mineral 
reserves remain for the most part untapped (Rosenblum 2016). In Latin American contexts 
the new extraction has also been accompanied by political and social movements fostering - 
with varying degrees of success - a radical agenda of post-extractivism. In particularly, this 
iThis included the assertion of indigenous rights of local communities over extractive 
resources, notably through the increased exercise of the right to free, prior and informed 
conse t institutionalized in various international legal instruments since the 1980s (see 
Raftopoulos 2017; Szablowski, 2007). 
By contrast, the rush for extractive minerals in African contexts, foremost in conflict-
rife Democratic Republic of Congo over the 1990s and elsewhere on the continent, boom in 
extractive investments on the African continent in the first decade of the 2000s came at the 
tail-end of structural adjustment programs, spearheaded by International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs). These reforms , which engineered the privatization of extractive 
economies to foster the regulatory strength of private actors and markets against political 
elites and weak governance. These policies did little to curb the Far-West like rush into 
Africa. Yet, iInternational campaigns spearheaded by international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs) such as Global Witness at the end of the 1990s have underscored the 
role played by minerals in violent conflict (on so- called “blood diamonds” underscored the 
Far-west like rush for extractive minerals in African contexts, foremost in the conflict-rife 
Democratic Republic of Congo). These advocacyCampaigns for contract and revenue 
transparency, environmental protection, and corruption investigations in the 2000s yielded 
some success in  mobilizations certainly played a critical role in spurring a global regulatory 
tide over extractive resources markets, including through the growing reach of the 1977 US 
Foreign corrupt practices Act (FCPA), domestic regulations in EU states, and EU regulations 
governing financial transactions (see Rich and Moberg 2015). . 
However, they could do little to curb the violence unleashed by this rush precisely 
because it unravelled in regions where global capitalism “finds minimally regulated zones in 
which to vest its operations” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012: 13). Indeed, these advocacy 
campaigns and policy initiatives happened “in a game of catch-up where the damage of the 
initial gaps have never fully been assessed” (Rosenblum 2016). Ongoing battles on the 
detrimental societal and environmental effects of extractive deals between multinationals and 
resource-rich states continuously underlinecontinue to stress the acuteness of contests over 
the distribution of natural resources and benefits derived from them. They also pinpoint 
“loopholes” in the reach of global regulations (see Cutler and Dietz 2017) and the difficulty 
(if not total lack) of remedies available to disenfranchised communities at the national and 
international levels (see Muir Watt et al. 2019). 
These struggles also underline that the question of who benefits from the “new 
extraction” on the African continent and how extractive deals sustain or counter injustice in 
the distribution of access to and/or benefits from natural resources is far from being resolved. 
Part of theis difficulty relates to the framing itself of the regulatory response to the 
issue of the distribution of natural resourcesgovernance of extractives on the African 
continent. The predominant focus on the “resource curse” idea (see for an excellent critical 
overview, Murrey forthcoming) has gained traction in research and policy-making since the 
end of the 1980s as the dominant lens to understand the poor development performance of 
natural resource-rich African countries, due to wealth capture by corrupt political elites and 
conflict.  (Collier 2007) - seen to be affecting resource-rich African countries by impeding 
economic and societal development due to wealth capture by corrupt political elites - remains 
for the most part surprisingly ahistorical and state-centric. Indeed, theThe “resource curse” 
explanation has exerted a strong policy pull from the 1990s. The overwhelming tendency of 
International Financial InstitutionsIFIs is to point to domestic political factors as the key 
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explanation for the disappointing returns of mining riches, i.e. corruption, lack of 
transparency and weak governance in African contexts (see Campbell 2009Collier 2007).  
has been continuously contradicted by the thriving of private foreign investments in 
the very countries hailed as “failures,” like Angola or the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Ferguson 2006). 
Further, the regulatory tide remains fragmented and ill-suited to take in the intensely 
globalized and financialized nature of extractive resources global value chains. For example, 
the long-protracted project for an EU regulation ensuring that specific minerals entering the 
EU have been sourced responsibly, and without funding conflict and human rights abuses, in 
line with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance on Responsible Supply Chains, is yet to cover 
“downstream” importers of minerals.  
These policy hurdles trigger acute challenges for scholarship. In the past couple of 
decades, the “resource curse” has generated intense debates, focused foremost on the 
methodology used to assert a causality between extractive governance and poor socio-
economic performance (see the critique by Bebbington et al. 2018: 3-4). They are deeply tied 
to knowledge gaps on the relationship between extractives, their role in contemporary global 
capitalism and the position of Africa in these developments. Existing scholarship still widely 
overlooks the contribution of extractive resources to global capitalism (see Di Muzio and 
Ovadia 2016) as much as the dynamics of extractive industries themselves. Critical global 
political economy scholarship is starting to tackle the characteristics of mineral markets as 
“global value chains” and the impact of globalization and financialization on their 
structuration (see Cutler and Dietz 2017). However, most scholarship remains premised on 
the assumption that global value chains are the product of recent shifting economic 
conditions that mostly respond to the strategies and structure of multinationals themselves 
(with few exceptions: see Deonandan and Dougherty 2016). Debates on the resource curse 
have since evolved to focus on institutional quality as a primary determinant of diverging 
development outcomes. Scholarship in economics is increasingly underlining that rather than 
simply resources themselves, it is the institutions of extraction that play a crucial role in 
shaping the societal and environmental impacts of extractive commodities (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2014). Thus, “‘getting the institutions right’ became the central objective in efforts 
at ‘escaping the resource curse’” (ibid: 3, quoting Humphreys et al. 2007). 
Yet, building partly on the resource curse debate as well as on scholarship that 
preceded it, a growing body of work is emphasizing the need to understand the role of these 
institutional drivers in resource-dependent development not simply as top-down externally-
driven variables to remedy the “resource curse”. Rather, it is their role in the longue durée 
that needs to be assessed: “one cannot build a framework to analyse the relationships between 
politics, extractive industry, and development and then introduce ‘institutions’ as an 
independent mediating variable. Such institutions are themselves a product of the same 
relationships that they mediate and have to be accounted for historically” (Bebbington et al. 
2018: 6). 
Looking at the longue durée of institutions of extraction recognizes that just like Latin 
America’s, much of Africa’s “economic and social history could be read as a long 
engagement with extraction” (Bebbington 2009: 14). The central role played by the African 
continent in the emergence and expansion of contemporary capitalism has long been 
established in a rich body of scholarship in political economy (drawing in particular on 
Rodney 1972) and anthropological and ethnographic work (see e.g., Ferguson 2006; Ellis 
2012). 
This article builds on and contributes to this body of work by channeling attention 
towards the role, in the longue durée, of law as an institution of extraction. The global 
regulatory tide has
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On the other hand, global regulatory shifts have spurred an increased demand for law, 
and with it for lawyers, to strengthen the governance of mineral value chainsmarkets, be it to 
fosterin the form of “corporate social responsibility” or, the stability of extractive contracts or 
to ensure their positive impact on societal, environmental and development sustainability. A 
great deal of the scholarship focused on international and domestic legal regimes governing 
extractives is concerned with the pluralism opened by the interplay between multiple, 
overlapping and often conflicting local, national, regional and international legal regimes (see 
Szablowski 2007) and the gaps for accountability fostered by the globalization and 
financialization of mineral value chains (Cutler and Dietz 2017). Certainly, the prominence 
taken by “corporate social responsibility” as a set of “soft” laws self-governing extractive 
industries has contributed to the growth of an interdisciplinary body of literature attuned to 
the power relations at play in the interactions between corporate activity and societies 
(Walker-Said and Kelly 2015).
HoweverHowever, that law, in the form of multiple, overlapping and often conflicting 
local, national, regional and transnational legal regimes, as well as soft and hard law, plays a 
constitutive role in the ordering of mineral global value chains is yet to have gained enough 
traction in scholarship (see IGLP Law and Global Production Working Group, 2016). 
Policies still overwhelmingly tend to focus on law as a top-down and external variable, 
seeing in “clear rules” of governance a solution to the poor development returns of resource-
rich African countries (e.g. Smith and Rosenblum 2011). 
, most of this scholarship is focused on the law as a top-down and external variable in 
these developments. That law, in the form of multiple, overlapping and often conflicting 
local, national, regional and transnational legal regimes, as well as soft and hard law, plays a 
constitutive role in the ordering of mineral global value chains is yet to have gained enough 
traction in legal scholarship (IGLP Law and Global Production Working Group, 2016).
When attention is channeled to the position of Africa in these developments, these knowledge 
gaps also reflect the protracted dependency lens under which the African continent continues 
to be viewed in existing scholarship. Just like Latin America, much of Africa’s “economic 
and social history could be read as a long engagement with extraction” (Bebbington 2009: 
14). The central role played by the African continent in the emergence and expansion of 
contemporary capitalism has long been established. Yet, the position of Africa in 
globalization continues overwhelmingly to be construed as one defined by exclusion and 
marginalization. The imagery of the “new frontier” is therefore not just historically 
inaccurate. Narratives that continue to portray Africa as a foil for arguments about European 
capitalist history (see Cooper 2014) have important political effects, not least because they 
shape knowledge and scholarly hierarchies about legal, political, and social developments 
across the continent. 
To overcome these policy hurdles and knowledge gaps, tThis article therefore calls for a 
renewed research agenda amenable to trace the interaction between politics, economics and 
lawlaw and extraction  in the political economy of African states and in their relationship 
with global markets for extractives in the longue durée.  The central claim of this research 
agenda is that uncovering the social, economic and political variables channeled through law 
and shaped by law  relationship between these variables over time provides a formidable 
entry point to trace the mechanisms by which role played by extractives in shaping the 
uneven and unequal connection between Africa and the world (see Cooper 2014) is being 
negotiated, justified and challenged over time. . 
Section 2 describes this research agendathe approach fostered here and the 
explanatory lens it is amenable to provide. It zooms in onto the specific role played by 
law(yers) in these developments. It suggests the relevance of a combining a political 
sociology of law and of lawyers through a micro focus, centered on the roles played 
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specifically by lawyers as builders of the state and intermediaries of globalization in Africa. 
This Such an approach underscores can help trace developments that remain otherwise 
invisible, notably the “interconnectedness” (Subrahmanyam 2004) between European 
colonialism on the continent, the emergence of global capitalism, and the consolidation of the 
contemporary international economic and legal political order since the colonial era. This 
mic o focus, further, can help overcome the dis-connection between efforts to foster the 
redistribution of natural resources in resource-rich African states, and outcomes seen to 
continuously favor the prominent position of Northern multinationals and state elites in the 
African South. 
The approach of globalization suggested here underlines dynamics of flows and 
counter-flows (see Ibhawohho 2013) that go beyond dichotomies between the “Global North” 
and the “Global South”, international law, and sovereignty. These dynamics indeed point to a 
more nuanced (though not less bleak) explanation of Africa’s unequal and uneven 
relationship with the global economy, as one shaped by the path of imperial legacies and 
successive interconnected waves of globalization across Africa.  Section 3 illustrates this 
research agenda with an emblematic empirical case-study: that of the “Africa Bar” in Paris, 
which has emerged as a key site in which extractive deals between multinational corporations 
and African Francophone states in West Africa are negotiated. It underlines the offshore yet 
connected structure of this small professional market, which, though tamed in recent years 
through regulatory pressures, still fosters inter-personal relations between French, white, 
corporate lawyers and African political elites. in the negotiation of extractive deals. 
A new research agenda to trace theLaw(yers) in the uneven and unequal relationship 
between Africa and the world economy 
Debates on the role of extractive resources in development, and that of law in regulating 
extractives are driven by politics of knowledge and policy pulls that tend to foster knowledge 
gaps, specifically on the interactions between extractive industries, global markets and 
domestic political, social and economic developments on the African continent. These 
knowledge gaps are particularly problematic as they contribute to an apparently intractable 
conundrum. The resource curse rests on the premise of poor governance at the domestic level 
in resource rich economies. It therefore looks to external regulation through legal norms, and 
the market as a counter-weight. At the forefront of efforts to regulate distribution conflicts 
over extractives, the law specifically illustrates the challenges raised for policy and 
scholarship by these knowledge gaps. Not only do existing debates on the role of law tend to 
evade the responsibility of extractive industries themselves and that of the market, they are 
also premised on a reductive definition of globalization that ignores the inter-connectedness 
of the local, and the global, and the economics, social and political forces that have shaped 
the international economic and legal order over time. 
What George Steinmetz has termed “imperial entanglements” (2013) has served to uncover 
how the history of the disciplines of anthropology and of sociology was deeply entrenched in 
the colonial enterprise. To date, studies of law and legal institutions in the African South have 
not undergone such an aggiornamento. Neither have economic studies. This is especially true 
for law and legal developments on the African continent.  Debates on the role of law and, 
legal institutions and the roles played by lawyersin the development of African states do not 
escape this a protracted dependency lens. The failure of the legal systems inherited from 
colonization (see World Bank 2003) has been coupled with the need to reform - if not 
reinvent - political, legal and economic institutions so as to check the tendency towards 
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personal, tyrannical and anti-entrepreneurial governance (Acemoglu and& Robinson 2001). 
This is coupled, furthermore, with an exceptional knowledge gap on legal professions in 
Africa that contrasts with the abundant literature on the contributions of lawyers to political 
and economic change in the US, Europe, Latin America and more recently in Asia (with 
some exceptions, see Gobe 2013, Dezalay 2015). A number of studies focused on the 
governance of extractives across Africa  have certainly underscored the positive effects of 
some legal reforms, especially international legal initiatives aimed at transforming the 
behavior of multinational extractive companies, such as section 1502 of the U.S. Dodd-
Franck Act of 2010, which requires publicly traded companies to ensure that the raw 
materials they use to make their products are not tied to the conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, or soft law initiative led by the corporate sector itself to foster the social 
responsibility of its members, such as the International Council on Mining and Metals (see 
Berman et al. 2017; Rich and Moberg 2015). Yet, some of these same studies are also 
highlighting paradoxes. Berman et al.’s economic study (2017) unsurprisingly correlates the 
surge of societal conflict at the local level with the presence of foreign extractive companies 
on the African continent, which account for 60% of the sector. However, they also emphasize 
the sustainability of social ties: according to these authors, the presence of multinational 
corporate firms with a colonial past does not increase violence at the local level. This 
somewhat surprising conclusion lies in political embeddedness, that is the capacity of these 
corporations to benefit from the (military) protection of the host state.  
Seemingly on a par with the ebb and flow of policy orientations and geostrategic 
interests over the continent, lawyers involved in the “new extraction” are overwhelmingly 
construed under two contrasting guises. They are either denounced as mercenaries at the 
service of new forms of colonial ‘looting’ (e.g. Burgis 2015) or idealized as a professional 
corps defending the rule of law (Halliday et al. 2012; Rostain and Regan 2014). These images 
of the law and lawyers are dis-connected from the longue durée of the transformation of the 
interaction between power and economics on the continent, and beyond, with the structure of 
capitalism.
The ongoing Global history turn in historical scholarship, particularly legal history 
(see Benton and Ford 2016), has opened Two recent developments in scholarship offer 
promising avenues to connect law to such political, economic and social variables, in the 
longue durée, politics and economics in the study of mineral value chains, and to position the 
African continent in these developments. The first is provided by a recent call for an inter-
disciplinary dialogue between critical global political economy and legal scholarship. 
Looking in particular at the prominence played by private contracts – and with them, by 
private actors - in global governance, Cutler and Dietz (2017) frontally address the question 
of “who gets what,” that is who benefits or loses out of a global economy growingly 
structured around private contracts as an institution of transnational governance, in that it 
continuously redefines the frontiers between politics, economics and societies at the domestic 
and global level. Part of this research agenda speaks specifically to the question of 
extractives.  Recent scholarship in economics, indeed, is increasingly underli ing that rather 
than simply resources themselves, it is the institutions and infrastructures of extraction that 
play a crucial role in shaping the societal and environmental impacts in the longue durée of 
extractive commodities (Acemoglu and Robinson 2014). The microcosm of Bonny, in the 
Niger Delta in Nigeria, is one of many striking examples: it has switched over time from 
slave trade, to palm oil, to crude oil by building on similarly entangled shadow and official 
economic routes and social networks (see Ellis 2012). When the attention is channeled 
towards the globalization and financialization of mineral value chains, this opens the need to 
document relations of power along these chains, from the domestic level through to global 
markets (see Cutler 2017). 
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The ongoing “Global history” turn in historical scholarship, and particularly legal 
history (see Benton and Ford 2016), is providing ways to tackle this. Underscoring This body 
of scholarship underscores the connections between successive and competing imperial 
models, emphasizing how  and how imperial legacies have been embedded in the modern 
“nation state” and the contemporary international legal and political order (see Burbank and 
Cooper 2010). Law was the cutting edge of colonialism (Chanock 1985), but colonialism was 
also ripe with conflicts over law’s remit. Thus, the imposition of a body of property law 
attuned to the economic interests of métropoles in their colonies was used to marshal the 
products of extraction - be it slaves, crops or minerals - to the metropolitan cores, and to 
ascertain a global political economy that would entrench colonies in the periphery. But the 
question of who benefited from property rights over land and extractive goods at the local 
level was the object of intense and continuous struggles - between European merchants, 
colonial administrators and local chiefs, among others (see Breckenridge 2011). In other 
words, law’s remit depended heavily on social and political variables at the local level. 
The embeddedness of the contemporary international legal and economic order in 
colonialism has long been established (see Anghie 2005). Yet, Benton and Ford (2016) also 
trace how international law emerged out of a haphazard process over several centuries. 
Ultimately contributing to the growing reach of the metropolitan core and fostering the 
position of the British as world hegemon from the mid-19th century, this process was heavily 
influenced and mediated by middle-men and social hierarchies at the local level and by 
political conflicts that circulated and boomeranged back and forth between the métropoles, 
the colonies and among empires. International law in the form of an international legal order 
reflected therefore a series of bilateral treaties and other legal regimes that created a series of 
permissive spaces for imperial enforcement relying on British municipal law - specifically in 
relation to property rights - and producing patchy regulatory regimes. 
This body of scholarship emphasizes the relevance of looking at social ties not only as 
a defining feature of colonial rule, but also as a structural component of law. They thereby 
open paths to trace the close association of law with the conversion of economic surpluses 
and power into enduring social relationships, in the longue durée. These insights on the 
diffusion of what was gradually institutionalized as international law – what Benton and Ford 
(2016) refer to as “vernacular constitutionalism”  can also provide interesting paths, 
synchronically, to make sense of the re-structuration of markets for extractive commodities 
since the 1990s due to their increased globalization and financialization. The highly 
fragmented structure of the global market for minerals, which gives the upper hand to private 
corporations (mostly Northern) in the production, pricing, and investment decisions, while 
allowing for a multiplicity of intermediaries, from local chiefs through to red-neck extractive 
companies less vulnerable to reputational costs, plays into the relative breadth and scope of 
global regulatory frameworks, themselves shaped by intense economic and political struggles 
between the United States and emerging economic cores, foremost China. Again, law seems 
to be the cutting edge of these dynamics. Ongoing initiatives aimed at transforming the 
asymmetrical relationship between African states and private Northern multi ational 
corporations stem from the need to stabilize foreign investments, away from the economic, 
political, and reputational costs of the renegotiation of extractive contracts, and their contests 
in arbitrational and jurisdictional settings, including by “third parties” to extractive contracts 
like local communities. Again, also, distribution conflicts over extractives are played through 
law and are as much about law’s remit as they unfold across multiple scales (see Muir Watt et 
al. 2019). 
A recent call for an inter-disciplinary dialogue between critical global political 
economy and legal scholarship to address the importance taken by multinationals in political 
and economic governance is offering some insights to address the challenges raised by this 
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fragmentation. Looking in particular at the prominence taken by private contracts – and with 
them, by private actors - in global governance, Cutler and Dietz (2017) frontally address the 
question of “who gets what,” that is who benefits or loses out of a global economy growingly 
structured around private contracts as an institution of transnational governance, in that it 
continuously redefines the frontiers between politics, economics and societies at the domestic 
and global level. Part of this research agenda speaks specifically to the question of 
extractives, by underscoring the need to document relations of power along mineral chains, 
from the domestic level through to global markets (see Cutler 2017). 
, this new research (see Burbank and Cooper 2010) has opened paths to explore the 
instrumental role played by lawyers and legal institutions as vectors of domination and 
globalization – to connect the products of economic exploitation - be it slaves, crops or 
minerals - to global markets, but also in the transformation of power and social hierarchies in 
the colonial states as well as in core economic powers. This has given way to recent 
scholarship highlighting the contributions of lawyers as brokers connecting imperial legacies 
with contemporary transformations of the state (see Dezalay 2018 ).
Combining these two foci – power in the different nodes of mineral value chains, as well as 
the longue durée of the impact of imperial legacies in the present – can prove to be 
particularly relevant to trace the prominence of extractive resources in the trajectory of 
African states, as much as in the structure of global capitalism over time. The boon of 
extractive economies on the African continent - oil and mining industries, and now related 
infrastructure and land projects - have been a core driver of economic, political and legal 
developments in Africa from pre-colonial eras to the present (see Ellis 2012), making those a 
paradigmatic site to explore the history of the uneven and unequal connections between 
Africa and the world, as much as the history of global capitalism (Cooper 2014). This is the 
case not only because of the symbiotic relationship in the development of modern capitalist 
economies in the métropoles that built out of their imperial synergies (see Etemad 2005) and 
the colonial roots of the contemporary legal and economic international system, but also 
because of the way the impetus for extraction shaped the colonial and post-colonial field of 
state power in African settings. Tracing this colonial imprint is instrumental to map out the 
postcolonial trajectories of African states, economically, politically, and legally. 
On the other hand, the structure of markets for extractives and these markets’ evolution from 
the pre- and colonial eras (from the slave trade onward) has continuously played into contests 
at the local, national, and international levels. These layered connections and contests have 
shaped the subsequent waves of restructuring of extractive economies nationally—from the 
post-independence waves of nationalization, to the “neo-liberal” privatizations of the 1980s 
through to the current reinstatement of the state as a development partner in “public-private 
partnerships.” They are also at the core of contests over the definition of “development,” as a 
responsibility of private extractive corporations, development institutions, and NGOs, or that 
of the state. 
Further, the highly fragmented structure of the global market for minerals, which gives the 
upper hand to private corporations (mostly Northern) in the production, prici g, and 
investment decisions, while allowing for a multiplicity of intermediaries, from local chiefs 
through to red-neck extractive companies less vulnerable to reputational costs, plays into the 
relative breadth and scope of global regulatory frameworks, themselves shaped by intense 
economic and political struggles between the United States and Asia. The law is at the core of 
these developments. The “cutting edge” of colonialism (Chanock 1985: 4), the law played a 
core role in struggles over extractives and their dividends (see Breckenridge 2011). The law 
is again central to the “new extraction” in Africa. Ongoing initiatives aimed at transforming 
the asymmetrical relationship between African states and private Northern multinational 
corporations stem from the need to stabilize foreign investments, away from the economic, 
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political, and reputational costs of the renegotiation of extractive contracts, and their contests 
in arbitrational and jurisdictional settings, including by “third parties” to extractive contracts 
like local communities. The law (and lawyers) are also instrumental in the negotiation of 
extractive deals between resource rich African states and multinationals. 
TheYet, such a research agenda is opened by these combined insights is exceptionally 
challenging as it requires combining focal lengths, by zooming in onto specific contexts and 
by zooming out on on global evolutions changes (see Cooper 2014) so as to trace the 
interconnectedness between legal, political, economic and social variables, and local, 
national, regional and global scales. It is also confronted to acute knowledge gaps, 
specifically on intermediaries, such as lawyers, involved in the negotiation of extractive 
deals. Seemingly on a par with the ebb and flow of policy orientations and geostrategic 
interests over the continent, lawyers involved in the “new extraction” are overwhelmingly 
construed under two opposed guises. They are either denounced as mercenaries at the service 
of new forms of colonial “looting” (e.g. Burgis 2015) or idealized as a professional corps 
defending the rule of law (see Halliday et al. 2012). 
Focusing Yet, focusing on lawyers - their trajectories, their characteristics and their 
professional strategies, can provide a formidable entry-point to trace these inter-connections.  
This This political sociology of law and of lawyers entry-point reflects on the one 
hand the research path opened by Ernst Kantorowicz (1989) and others in his wake, who have 
shown that lawyers are structurally positioned to play “double games” (Dezalay and Garth 
2011). While at the service of power holders - and as such playing a central role of 
legitimation of state power - lawyers also need to distance themselves from politics, as a 
condition to protect the autonomy of the law, and with it their professional practices. It 
Tracing these “double games” has opened rich avenues to trace and account foralso takes in 
the specificity of the interstitial position of legal elites - African, European, and others -  -, 
across time and space, in the trajectory of the state and as intermediaries of the successive 
phases of globalization on the African continent. Thus, far from anecdotal evidence, details 
of lawyers’ trajectories in colonial and post-colonial contexts has helped to uncover 
continuous strategies of double games across law, politics, and economics, and between the 
local and the global (see Dezalay 2015; 2018). 
Negotiating sovereignty as “shared out, layered [and] overlapping” (Burbank and 
Cooper 2010: 17) in imperial settings, lawyers could thus be seen to navigate between 
corporate and state power, the colony and the métetropoles and inter-imperial confrontations. 
Imperial legal realms were indeed particularly favorable to the positions of lawyers as both 
collaborators and opponents (Oguamanam and Pue 2016): thus, lawyers’ double games were 
embedded in, as much as they were shaping, battles over state power..
 This micro-focus on lawyers’ trajectories can also underscoreThis approach is 
instrumental to trace how the legacy of the imperial realm is played out in the present, 
providing the path from which current developments emerge or diverge from (Dezalay and 
Garth 2010). But it also emphasizes how, in the present, hegemonic battles continue to be 
played in conflicts through and around law. Indeed, these imperial legacies have also enabled 
the continuous circulation of lawyers, and their roles as go-betweens across sector, time, and 
scale in the postcolonial trajectories of the state: between politics, society and the market, 
local, national, and global fields (Dezalay 2018). This entry-point has indeed proven a 
formidable way to account for patterns of globalization in the contemporary era, in particular 
to trace US-led hegemonic exports of ideals and practices across Latin America and Asia 
(Dezalay and Garth 2002; 2010). De sa e Silva and Trubek (2018) underscore the 
interdependence, if not symbiosis, between the professional power of corporate lawyers and 
economic development strategies in the past thirty years in Brazil, and the importance of 
alignment with and resources drawn from international links, specifically with the corporate 
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legal sector in the US. In a current context of acute global competition over critical minerals 
and carbon energy, and growing contests for hegemony by new economic superpowers like 
China, tracing the profiles, resources and strategies of lawyers involved in the negotiation of 
extractive contracts between multinationals and resource-rich African states can thus offer a 
way not only to see how imperial pasts are woven into the present, but also how new forms of 
imperialism may be emerging. 
This is rendered especially visible, as in the case-study that follows when the focus turns to 
the question of extractives and who benefits from them. 
A case-study of the “Africa Bar” in Paris: offshore, yet connectediii
The case study used presented here to provide an empirical example is an apparently counter-
intuitive illustratio : the “Africa” Bar in Paris, which has emerged as a key site in which 
extractive deals between multinational corporations and African states are negotiated. Yet, 
tracing the individual trajectories and professional strategies of the lawyers operating within 
this social microcosm underscores how this site emerged as key marketplace in which 
extractive deals, along with other emerging economic sectors such as infrastructures and 
telecommunications, are negotiated between multinational corporations and African states. 
This entry-point also helps explain the offshore geographical position of this site due to the 
an enduring double position of Paris: as a former colonial métropole, and also as a beach-
head in the expansion of U.S.-.- and U.K.-led globalization of corporate law toward Europe 
from the 1980s, and more recently into Africa. The analysis of the social relations at play in 
this microcosm thus provides an emblematic entry-point to trace how the relationship 
between extractive economies, state transformations, and the position of Africa in 
globalization are negotiated in the longue durée. It is also a crucial site to map out law’s 
entanglement with social networks, politics, and economics, across time and space. 
Focusing on lawyers operating within this “Africa” Bar in Paris, I have relied on a 
qualitative methodology that can be described as relational biography.iv Asking respondents 
who they are, that is exploring not only their professional and educational background but 
also their social characteristics, is a way to trace how successful their strategies could be in 
entering and positioning themselves within this small professional market. Beyond, it is a 
way to map out the configuration of this space across time and space.
This empirical focus helps explain the apparently paradoxical position of this Bar, 
located in Paris, and therefore offshore even though if focuses on extractive deals involving 
African states. Channelling attention towards the agents invested in this Bar and their 
characteristics is also the only way to depart from apparently irreconcilable oppositions - 
between the national, and the international, and foremost the ideological trope under which 
these extractive deals are commonly construed. “It’s a White’s business!” v interjected a 
senior economic consultant asked about dealings between resource-rich African states and 
multinationals from the North. The spectre of neo-colonialism in the on-going rush for 
natural resources in Africa is intensified by the economy of appearances which shrouds the 
industry. Talks of mining ““booms”” or of the ““perfect storm”” are mired with rumours. Not 
only are extractive contracts between resource-rich states and multinationals for the most part 
sealed under a lid of secrecy. But accurate data on actual extractive potentials, projects and 
economic returns are hard, if not impossible, to come by. Particularly in France, due to the 
sulphurous legacy of the ““Françafrique,””vi the reputation of lawyers involved in dealings in 
the African continent has been tainted with phantasms and denunciations. The “Club of 
Africans,” hailed as the “white marabouts of the Françafrique” (Hugeux 2007), was 
described somewhat scathingly by a respondent as comprising the “incompetent,” the 
“suitcase carriers,” the “skilled-ones who know how to carry suitcases” and the “skilled ones 
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who carry portfolios.”vii 
Yet, the originally extremely select “Africa club” of Paris has recently grown into an 
enlarged though still restricted market of about twenty lawyers, controlled by a dozen Paris 
offices of U.S. and U.K. multinational corporate law firms. But Yet, this small market 
remains dominated predominantly by French male lawyers operating within these firms. The 
trajectory of a prominent member of this Bar can help explain what can thus be described as a 
symbolic revamping of legal deals between multinational corporations and resource-rich 
states on the African continent - but only, though, through a slight displacement in the 
structure of positions within this small professional market. After studying law in France, 
‘Antoine’Antoine left for Vanuatu, as a “conscientious objector,”viii where he was appointed 
as public prosecutor at the country’s independence in 1980. Antoine then studied 
international law in Australia, which he described as “a rare vocation” at the time. After 
working at the Crédit du Nord for two years in financing, he moved to Gabon, as an associate 
at Fidafrica, the legal branch of PricewaterCoopers (PwC), until 1998. In this capacity, he 
became the counsel of Samuel Dossou Aworet - Gabon’s “Mr Oil.” 
The recent conversion of this “White African” as a vocal proponent of the “social 
responsibility of corporations,” notably as a member of the Corporate Social Responsibility 
Committee of the American Bar Association, can be explained by external shocks - 
politically and economically driven - that have contributed to restructuring the social 
structure of this small niche of counsels for corporations and African heads of state. The 
growth of this legal market can be attributed in part to the increased financialization of 
commodities markets in the past fifteen years, and with it to the growing technicality of 
dealings on the continent (see UNCTAD 2012). In these dynamics, mMultinational corporate 
law firms were better positioned to benefit from these changes due to , with their collective 
know how, from the negotiation of contracts, to arbitration - could be better positioned. The 
2008 financial crisis and, before that, the Enron scandal in 2002 which precipitated the 
demise of Andersen and shed light on the conflicts of interest of consulting firms, like PwC, 
until then the most thoroughly and widely pre-positioned in the African continent, also 
opened new opportunities for multinational corporate law firms towards these new emerging 
economic markets (see The Economist 2015).  
Other global drivers help explain the dynamics of this enlargement. On the one hand, 
incentives for the global regulation of dealings between foreign corporations and resource-
rich states in Africa increasingly impact on the operations of multinational corporations on 
the continent. For the most part a set of soft law - known as “corporate social responsibility,” 
non-binding on corporations - these regulations carry heavy reputational costs. The growing 
reach of the 1977 US FCPA against corruption, and the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (Rich and Moberg 2015) also played an instrumental role. But eExtractive deals in 
the African continent are foremost also heavily impacted by development policies and the 
role of invisible actors sitting at the negotiation table between multinationals and resource-
rich African states:  - the World Bank, and bilateral development agencies -: a trilateral 
relation between development donors, corporations and states that is specific to African 
continent. Most lawyers in the “Africa club” thus got their introduction to the developing 
continent by working on sovereign debt restructuring in the 1980s. The waves of 
privatization of extractive industries - spearheaded by the World Bank through the 1980s - 
opened up opportunities for corporate lawyers, and so did the promotion of “public-private 
partnerships” from the early 1990s, as they position the contract and the lawyer at the heart of 
the relation between the public sector and the private sector (see Vauchez 2012: 79). 
Driven foremost by the need to stabilize foreign investments - against challenges to 
extractive contracts, like national fiscal policies of “upwards adjustments” (so-called 
“resource nationalism”), and jurisdictional contests - a number of North-driven policy 
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endeavours have aimed at “levelling the playing field” between foreign corporations and 
African states since the 2010s. For example, the “Connex Initiative”ix spearheaded by the 
German government during its presidency of the G7 in 2014 aimed at drafting a “code of 
conduct” to “strengthen advisory support to low-income country governments in their 
negotiation of complex commercial contracts - to make the support that is available more 
comprehensive and more responsive to governments’s needs and to contribute to fairer, more 
sustai able investment deals.”x The African Legal Support Facility set up in 2010 in Abidjan 
under the umbrella of the African Development Bank - and the sponsorship of the NGO 
Transparency International - similarly endeavours to provide assistance to African countries 
to strengthen their legal expertise and negotiating capacity in debt management and litigation, 
natural resources and extractive industries management and contracting, investment 
agreements, and related commercial and business transactions. For both initiatives, a core aim 
is therefore to restructure legal services to African states away from a charismatic market of 
shadow advisors, towards an enlarged and more transparent market of legal services to states. 
Yet, to understand the ambiguous impact of these changes on the “Africa club” in 
Paris it is necessary to relate them to two other connected dynamics: the structuration of the 
corporate Bar in Paris over time; and the threads of relations between France and its former 
colonies. Both define barriers of entry and the distribution of positions in a space whose 
structure has been transformed under the impetus of the “Wall street” law firm model since 
the 1990s (see Dezalay 1992), but whose boundaries remain defined by the capacities to 
access and juggle with across poles of power (economics, politics, social) shaped by the 
relations between Paris and its former colonies. 
This is particularly visible in the trajectory of one of the few Africans within this 
select market, Pascal Agboyibor. In his late forties, this Togolese lawyer is one of the very 
few – there are but a dozen – Africans working at multinational corporate law firms, what 
more, as a sitting member of the administrative council of the U.S. firm Orrick Herrington & 
Sutcliffe LLP and the head of its Africa department in Paris. Agboyibor is hailed as a 
“shadow power broker” (Ngisi 2015) of transactions between states and foreign corporations 
in the African continent. With a 60 people strong department, Orrick, he claims, invests a 
huge proportion of its activities - 20% - in Africa. 
“I was taught very early on that I would become a lawyer.”xi The law, for Agboyibor 
is an acute political and family matter. His father, Yawovi Agboyibo, a former president of 
the Lomé Bar, political opponent and Prime minister in the transition between the 
Gnassingbé regimes (in 2006-2007) played a prominent role in the transition of Togo to 
multi-partyism in 1991. Yawovi Agboyibo had also turned to corporate law in the early 
1970s by integrating the very first law firm of the country,xii after studying law in France. 
During an era when the newly independent state of Togo was massively recruiting into the 
administration, this choice appeared like an anomaly. Yet, investing in corporate law had 
insured the conversion of the resources of this royal family, evinced from local power since 
the 1930sxiii by the French colonial administration, towards the political and economic 
networks tying the country to its former métropole. 
One generation later, this proximity contributed to propel Pascal Agboyibor into the 
close-knit corporate Bar in Paris, first in 1993 at Jeantet et Associés, one of the French 
pioneers of corporate law, before joining the Paris branch of the U.K. firm Watson, Farley 
and Williams in 2000, whose teams integrated with Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP in 
2002. Agboyibor became a partner at Orrick in 2003. After studying law in Lille, Agboyibor 
built up his portfolio of African relations during a secondment at the African Development 
Bank in Abidjan in 1996 and on introductions from his father - notably to take on the latter’s 
arbitration disputes between the Democratic Republic of Congo and “vulture funds.”xiv
Agboyibor’s trajectory thus unveils a “layered” habitus pointing to the multiple 
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historical strata of legal globalization on the African continent as much as their connexions 
with local struggles and political hierarchies. But it also points to the wider transformation of 
corporate legal markets since the 1990s and the prominent yet ambiguous position of Paris in 
these developments. When he started his career, Agboyibor strategically invested in 
securitization, positioning himself in the financialisation of commodities markets. He 
reinvested fully his African portfolio in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, which prompted 
the search of multinational corporate law firms for new markets in emerging economies, 
foremost including Africa. 
While only 10% of Agboyibor’s practice involved business transactions on the 
African continent in 2008, it now accounts for 99% of his time. Though, when he entered 
Jeantet in the early 1990s, there were but a handful of Africans in corporate law firms in Paris 
- and elsewhere. His first “African” case involved the Chad-Cameroun pipeline. “It was the 
old argument at the time. They needed an African to sit at the table. There is a deep symbolic 
violence behind this. This is probably what made me leave Jeantet. There is a huge difference 
between French and Anglo-Saxon firms on this.” The stormy creation of a branch of Orrick, 
orchestrated by Agboyibor, in Abidjan in 2014 - it triggered an outcry from the Bar in 
Abidjan (see Pierrepont 2014) - also emphasizes the difficult, thorny dynamic of this new 
wave of legal globalization into Africa. 
Part of the success of U.S. and U.K. corporate law firms in dominating the corporate 
commodities legal market for extractives in Paris also stems out of the huge capacity of 
multinational law firms - as opposed to solo legal practice - in dodging the volatility of 
markets for commodities (and with them, that of legal markets), including by waging multi-
front legal strategies: from the negotiation of contracts to arbitration or litigation. As 
underscored by a respondent: “the difference between Agboyibor and others is the structure 
of the firm: it is better than having lone lawyers doing all the work.”xv Yet, it is also no 
accident that predominantly French lawyers operate within this market. It enables these firms 
to build on a symbolic displacement, away from the stigmata of the “Françafrique”, while 
still also benefiting from the know who of these lawyers.
It is perhaps on the side of services to states that the transformation of the “Africa” 
Bar in Paris is the deepest – though the shift remains symbolic. As explained by a respondent, 
in the past “there was not much regulation. We still work a lot for states, but it is mostly 
private practice. The practice of counselling for states has evolved. It is more transparent, 
more open. Now it works a lot on the basis of tenders. Before, it was through inter-personal 
relations; presidents and political advisors would meet their counsels by chance encounters, 
in restaurants. Now except for counsels to presidents, where it is different, it is all on the 
basis of tenders.”xvi  Initiatives such as “Connex” or the African Legal Facility mentioned 
above aim precisely at opening up this still extremely close-knit market defined by 
charismatic characteristics and inter-personal ties.
The stake of these transformations is indeed access to Africa as a new market for 
corporations and law multinationals from the U.S. and the U.K.: as stated by a professional 
publication, “an Africa office is no magic door to deals” (Taylor 2016) especially if new-
comers are not corporations with an imperial past (The Economist 2016). The offshore – yet 
connected – structure of the Africa Bar in Paris could thus be long term - depending on the 
pace of development and varied structure of national legal fields on the African continent.   
Conclusion 
In media and specialist accounts, talks of the end of the commodities’ “super cycle” - 
and with it, the fear of African states plunging into the debt crisis of the 1980s - have re-
ignited the “resource curse” debate and the desirability of governing trade and financial flows 
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globally (see Rich and Moberg 2015).  Policies continue to correlate the poor development 
performance of resource-rich African states to their poor governance and the weakness of 
their institutions.  In mainstream scripts about legal globalization in Africa, this weakness of 
African national economies has been linked to the failure of the legal systems inherited from 
colonization. The need to reform - if not reinvent - political, legal, and economic institutions 
continues to be heralded as a way to check the tendency toward personal, tyrannical, and anti-
entrepreneurial governance. 
Yet, channeling attention towards law not as an external variable to curb the “resource 
curse”, but rather itself an institution of extraction in the longue durée can provide for a more 
nuanced picture of the role played by law, over time, to negotiate, justify and challenge the 
uneven and unequal relationship between Africa and the world economy over time. the 
thriving of private foreign investments in the very countries hailed as “failures,” like Angola 
or the Democratic Republic of Congo opens a much more complex image than the mere 
economic dependency of the continent - notably with the expansion of a “Beijing consensus” 
freed from political conditionality, and outside the scope of U.S. imperial politics (see Halper 
2010).
As this article has endeavored to highlight, the renewed - propounded or contested - 
prominence of the African continent in the global competition for extractive resources opens 
an opportunity, and needed inquiry, to assess the relationship between capital investment, 
politics, and law in these transformations. 
The position of the “Africa” Bar in Paris underscored the relevance of looking at the 
past to understand these changesthe transformation of this relationship over time, and how 
“Africa” is being built into a new market for extractive resources. To account for these 
changes, however, it is necessary to go beyond an understanding of globalization as a flow 
driven by the North into the African South. Rather, cChanneling the attention towards the 
characteristics of the agents invested in the “Africa” Bar, their biographies and their 
professional strategies, underscored the specificities of this professional market as a “cross-
roads” space. Structured around combinations of resources - economic, social, political, and 
legal -, this space is by definition trans-national, shaped by imperial legacies and the 1980s’ 
wave of corporate legal globalization into continental Europe. 
It is also a symbolic space where the terms of the unequal and uneven relationship 
between Africa and the world economy are constantly being (re)defined. What makes the 
“Africa” Bar in Paris offshore, yet deeply connected, is precisely the tension between the 
need to rely on local structures of power to do business on the African continent, and the 
strategy of evading local legal institutions. 
TheThe “Africa” Bar in Paris emerges indeedis also as a nexus where overlapping and 
at times contradictory dynamics of globalization are at play , and where the stakes of who 
benefits from these struggles are shaped as much by imperial legacies as proximity to new 
poles of economic and political power. Paris thereby emerges as a marketplace of , indeed, is 
a nexus of “connected histories”:  U.S.-led corporate legal globalization, colonial, and 
postcolonial relations. , and currently tYet, dramatic and ongoing changes on the continent 
itself, notably with the expansion of thriving local corporate bars in regional powerhouses 
like South Africa or Nigeria (see Klaaren 2015), along with the global competition between 
the United States, Europe and powerful new economic and political centers, like foremost 
China, may be yet again re-shaping the relationship between Africa and the global economy. 
The expansion of a “Beijing consensus” freed from political conditionality, and outside the 
scope of U.S. imperial politics (see Halper 2010) and materialized with the massive Chinese 
investments into Africa through the “Belt and Road initiative” are indeed heralding the 
continent “as a place where international rivalries play out” (The Economist 2019). a, over 
raw commodities. 
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What makes the “Africa” Bar in Paris offshore, yet deeply connected, is precisely the tension 
between the need to rely on local structures of power to do business on the African continent, 
and the strategy of evading local institutions of power deemed inefficient and corrupted. But 
at stake is also the intense competition in the ongoing wave of globalization into the 
continent, with international corporate law firms vying to secure their turf in a volatile and 
fragile global context. The challenge now, in the next step of this research agenda, would be 
precisely to zoom in ontoout into these global competition, and specifically the role played by 
China, as much as to zoom in onto local legal markets across the African continent to trace 
their transformation over time in relation to national fields of state power, regional dynamics, 
and their connections with former métropoles and these new poles of global power. 
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